

HR-M/SG 7/25/91

DO NOT RECATEGORIZE

100-11

REF ID: A100-11

Recategorize as
Category "A"

August 4, 1973

100-11

✓S/ Warren A. Henderson

OCT 11 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE RE BERLIN

1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the western occupying powers' movements to and from west Berlin.

More identification of the vehicles as those of one of the western occupying powers will be provided to GDR officials on demand, and will not be construed as acquiescence in substitution. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.

2. Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in west Germany and Berlin, to be taken during the period between now and May 27, of a kind that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.

3. After the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the next unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a escort car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary.

S: JDulles

762.00/1-2331

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(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

4. After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel effort would be made to increase pressure on the Soviets and the GDR, such, the following lines:

- a) Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of victory, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration could also be given to further forms of diplomatic pressure, including withdrawal of our ambassador from Moscow;
- b) Military preparation would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly from Germany.

5. The decision to apply further military pressures by the use of additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the

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German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present "ultimatum" as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U. S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

s:JFDulles:ma:jm

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Reclassified as
Category 'A'
by Warren A. Henderson

January 29, 1959

OCT 11 1965

Comments on Memorandum of Conclusions
of White House Conference on Berlin

1. I assume that the numbering of the paragraphs does not necessarily imply chronology. If it did, then Paragraph 6 which concerns a Foreign Ministers meeting designed to avert the threatened crisis would certainly be the first paragraph.
2. Paragraph 2 does not indicate the timing at which we begin preparatory and precautionary military measures. I presume it is intended that these measures be implemented prior to 27 May or preferably prior to the date of a Four-Power Meeting on Germany. This is in accordance with the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. As a matter of organization, I would recommend that the second part of Paragraph 1 of the memorandum be incorporated into Paragraph 3 since Paragraph 3 as written deals with the immediate action in the event of substitution of GDR for Soviet officials.
4. The material enclosed in the parentheses in Paragraph 5 would also belong in the present Paragraph 3. As I understand it, if this course of action is approved, U. S., British or French guards would be available to take the place of the Soviet officials the day the Soviet officials are missing (theoretically 27 May).
5. I do not believe that the memorandum goes quite as far as the President stated in the meeting. While I do not believe it necessary to define the amount of force which we would intend to use if the time came, I do think that some mention might be made of a gradual increasing of pressure such as withdrawal of Ambassadors, breaking of relations, issuing of an ultimatum, etc. before major military action is resorted to.

Carded

John S. D. Eisenhower

John S. D. Eisenhower
Major, U. S. Army
Assistant Staff Secretary

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Recategorized as
Category "A"

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/s/ Warren A. Henderson

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January 30, 1950

OCT 11 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL A. J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Andy -

With Secretary Dulles' agreement, his memorandum of the conclusions of Thursday's meeting at the White House on Berlin has been redrawn to take account of Major Eisenhower's suggestions and our discussion. I enclose a copy for your records.

JOSEPH N. GREENE, JR.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum

S/S-RO

JAN 30 1950
A true copy of
the original.

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S:JNGreene, Jr. :jm

called

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DRAFT FOLLOWS

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**MEMORANDUM OF CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE RE BERLIN**

1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet
officials as regards the Western occupying powers' movements to and
from Berlin.

If GDR officials merely demand identification of the vehicles
as those of one of the Western occupying powers, such identification
will be provided. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will
be acquiesced in.



2. Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military
measures in West Germany and Berlin of a kind that would be detectable
by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.

3. After the attempt/or announced substitution of GDR for USSR,
the next unit to go through would be a truck accompanied by a scout car
vehicle with a
or some other capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the

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conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary.



4. After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel efforts would be made along the following lines:

- a) Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of veto there, to a special session of the General Assembly;
- b) Military preparations would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly

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from Germany.

5. The decision to use additional forces would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)



6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present "ultimatum" as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered

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In the light of the allied position.)

